Ideas from 'Evidentialism' by Daniel M. Mittag [2011], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Routledge Companion to Epistemology' (ed/tr Bernecker,S/Pritchard,D) [Routledge 2014,978-0-415-72269-8]].

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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

19722

We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence

19723

Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten

19720

Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

19721

Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience